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Throwing Like A Girl: Constitutional
Implications of Title IX Regarding Gender
Discrimination in High School Athletic
Programs
INTRODUCTION

1997 marked the 25th anniversary of Title IX, the federal law that prohibits gender discrimination in high school and college sports programs that
receive federal funds.' Within a decade of its enactment, the number of girls
competing in school sports increased by 500%.2 Benefits of athletic
participation include greater confidence, self-esteem and pride.3 Students also
are less likely to become involved with drugs, less likely to become pregnant
and more likely to graduate high school than students who do not participate
in sports.4 Despite Title IX's success in reducing gender discrimination in
sports,5 women continue to be denied equal access to the benefits of athletic
competition.
Title IX requires that male and female sports programs receive the same
benefits, such as: equipment, uniforms and supplies; access to weight room
and training room; equal practice facilities; same size and quality locker
rooms and competition facilities; equal access to practice and games during
prime time; same quality coaches; opportunity to play the same quality
opponents; the same awards and awards banquets; and to have cheerleaders
1. Title IX states that "no person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any educational program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." Education
Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, §§ 901-09, 86 Stat. 235 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§
1681-1688 (1994)).
2. Susan Buttenwieser, Time Flies When You're Changingthe World, Ms. Magazine,
Volume VIII, No. 3, at 46. See also, Women's Sports Foundation, Women's Sports Facts
(visited Sept. 29, 1998) <http://www.lifetimetv.com/WoSport/stage/TOPISS/html/women
_ssportsfacts.html> [hereinafter Women's Sports Foundation] (stating that by 1993 nearly 800
girls wrestled, 353 girls played baseball, and 334 girls played football on high school teams in
the United States).
3. Women's Sports Foundation, supra note 2 (noting, further, that 80% of women who
are key leaders in Fortune 500 companies participated in sports during their.childhood; and
citing additional benefits such as positive body image and up to a sixty percent reduction in the
risk of breast cancer).
4. Id.
5. John Gibeaut, Shooting for Parityon the Playing Fields, 83 May A.B.A. J. 40, at
40 (May 1997).
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and the band perform at games. 6 Despite the requirements of Title IX, extremely athletic girls are still denied equal access to the benefits of athletic competition. Karen O'Connor 7 and Sandra Lynn Bucha a are two such examples.
Karen, an extremely gifted athlete, has played on organized basketball
teams since she was seven years old. While participating in various programs,
camps, and competitions, she has almost always been her team's leading

scorer. Over the years she has received numerous awards recognizing her

ability. All her life, Karen has played with, and out performed, boys. As a
sixth-grade student, she wanted to play interscholastic basketball with these
same boys. Even though her ability had been judged by a professional

basketball coach as that of a high school sophomore, the eleven-year-old was
not allowed to try out for the boys' team. She voluntarily chose not to try out
for the girls' team, which did not provide the same caliber of competition as
did the boys' team.9

Common differences imposed on female basketball teams include a

"half-court" game, allowing six players on the court, permitting only the three
forwards to shoot, not allowing the three non-forwards to cross the center line,

and having nine feet high baskets.' These rules differ significantly from the

rules of traditional basketball. Usually only five players are allowed on the
court, all players may shoot and cross the half-court line, and baskets are ten

6. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (1997) provides for equal athletic opportunity for members
of both sexes. Among other factors, the following are to be considered when determining
whether opportunities are equal:
Whether the selection of sports and levels of competition effectively
accommodate the interests and abilities of members of both sexes; The provision
of equipment and supplies; Scheduling of games and practice time;Travel and per
diem allowance;Opportunity to receive coaching and academic tutoring;
Assignment and compensation of coaches and tutors;Provision of locker rooms,
practice and competitive facilities;Provision of medical and training facilities and
services;Provision of housing and dining facilities and services;Publicity.

See also Reebok and the Women's Sports Foundation, Myth Busting: What Every Female
Athlete Should Know! (visited Dec. 23, 1997) <httpllwww.lifetimetv.com/WoSport/LIBRARY/

INFO/myth.htm> [hereinafter Myth Busting].

7. For facts of the Karen O'Connor story, see generallyO'Connor v. Board of Educ.,
449 U.S. 1301 (1980); 645 F.2d 578 (7th Cir. 1981); 545 F. Supp. 376 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
8. For facts of the Sandra Lynn Bucha story, see generally Bucha v. Illinois High Sch.
Ass'n, 351 F. Supp. 69 (N.D. Il1.1972).
9. See O'Connor,449 U.S. at 1306 (rejecting Karen's argument that her exclusion
from the boys' team was a violation because her interests and abilities were not accommodated
as the Title IX requires, the court ruled that the school could prevent her from playing based
solely on her sex).
10. See, e.g., Cape v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 424 F. Supp. 732, 736
(E.D. Tenn. 1976), rev'd, 563 F.2d 793 (6th Cir. 1977); Bucha v. Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 351
F. Supp. 69 (N.D. I11.
1972).
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feet high." Furthermore, when scheduling conflicts arise, it is common for the

women's sports to be scheduled during the off-season. 2
Like Karen, Sandra Bucha was denied equal access to the benefits sports
provide, despite her athletic ability. Sandra was excluded from trying out for
and participating on her school's interscholastic swimming team solely
because of her sex. Her school not only prohibited girls from playing on boys'
teams, but it also enforced different treatment based on sex. The school
imposed rules that prohibited female athletes from staying overnight for any
athletic competitions, limited awards for female athletes to one dollar, and
prohibited cheering for female teams. None of these rules applied to male
athletes. The Illinois court upheld these rules despite the lack of any rational
legitimate state purpose advanced by such inequality. 3
Karen and Sandra are not alone. Female athletes are disadvantaged by
differences in rules; by scheduling during nontraditional seasons; by less
qualified and underpaid coaching staffs; and at times, by a complete lack of

an interscholastic team. 4 This disadvantage is further complicated by

conflicting federal and state court decisions regarding sex discrimination in
athletics.
Nearly all court rulings have been decided under the Equal Protection
Clause of the United States Constitution.' 5 However, the proper standard of
review has not been agreed upon, even within the same jurisdiction. 6 Some
11. Id. See also Virginia P. Croudace and Steven A. Desmarais, Where the Boys Are:
Can SeparateBe Equal in School Sports?, 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1425, 1428 (1985).
12. See, e.g., Ridgeway v. Montana High Sch. Ass'n, 858 F.2d 579,580 (9th Cir. 1988)
(holding females' basketball and volleyball seasons do not need to be aligned with the national
norm).
13. Bucha v. Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 351 F. Supp. 69 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (finding
limitations that applied to girls' athletic contests but not the boys' did not violate equal
protection). The court found it rational that girls' athletic contests were purposely devoid of
competition, with emphasis on intramural activities rather than concentration and competitiveness as in the boys programs. Furthermore, the court upheld a regulation prohibiting girls from
participating in more than one sport on any day. The court reasoned that such regulations could
be upheld because the Fourteenth Amendment does not create fictitious equality where there
is real difference. Id. at 74.
14. Haffer v. Temple Univ., 678 F. Supp. 517, 524 (E.D. Pa. 1987); Ridgeway v.
Montana High Sch. Ass'n, 633 F. Supp. 1564, 1572 (D. Mont. 1986), affd, 858 F.2d 579 (9th
Cir. 1988); Cape v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 424 F. Supp. 732 (E.D. Tenn.
1976), rev'd, 563 F.2d 793 (6th Cir. 1977). See also Diane Heckman, Women & Athletics: A
Twenty Year Retrospective on Title IX, 9 U. Miami Ent. & Sports L. Rev. 1, 52 (1992) (stating
that applying different rules to women makes it more difficult for women to be recruited for
women's collegiate teams).
15. See Bucha v. Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 351 F. Supp. 69 (N.D. I11.1972); Kelly v.
Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 367 F. Supp. 1388 (E.D. Wis. 1974); Leffel v.
Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 444 F. Supp. 1117 (E.D. Wis. 1978).
16. See Estate of Hicks, 174 Ill.2d 433, 438 (1996) (ruling that because Article 1,
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courts have ruled that it is not unconstitutional to deny girls access to boys'

teams, 7 whereas others have held that girls must be allowed to play on boys'

teams whenever they want." Others have held they must be allowed to play
on boys' teams only if a similar girls' team is not available. 9 Still others have
held that girls must only be allowed to play on boys' teams if the sport

involved is not a contact sport.2"

Likewise, courts have handed down

inconsistent rulings on the issue of whether boys must be allowed a reciprocal
right to play on girls' sports teams. 2'

Section 18, of the 1970 Constitution bars discrimination on the basis of sex by the state or its
units of local government or school districts, a classification based on sex is a "suspect
classification" and must meet strict judicial scrutiny); People v. Ellis, 311 N.E.2d 98 (I11.1974);
Phelps v. Bing, 316 N.E.2d 775 (Ill. 1974); People v. M.A., 529 N.E.2d 492 (I11.1988). But
see, Bucha v. Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 351 F. Supp. 69, 74-75 (holding that sex is not an
inherently suspect classification and that treating the sexes differently is justified if a rational
relationship is shown between the actions taken and the goals of interscholastic athletic
competition); Petrie v. Illinois, 394 N.E.2d 855, 857 (Ill. 1979) (noting that the Supreme Court
has never treated gender classifications as suspect and that gender classifications must serve
important government objectives and be substantially related to achieving those objectives).
17. O'Connor,449 U.S. 1301 (stating sex based discrimination is needed in order to
prevent boys from dominating girls sports). See also Ritacco v. Norwin Sch. Dist., 361 F. Supp.
930 (W.D. Pa. 1973) (finding that where there is a rational basis for providing separate but
equal teams, and separate but equal teams are provided, then prohibiting girls from participating
on the boys' teams does not unfairly discriminate against girls).
18. Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 334 A.2d 839, 843
(Pa. 1975) (holding girls must be allowed to play on the boys' team even if a girls team is
provided); Darrin v. Gould, 540 P.2d 882 (Wash. 1975) (holding that girls must be allowed to
play on all sports teams, including wrestling and football). See also Hoover v. Meiklejohn, 430
F. Supp. 164 (D. Colo. 1997) (holding excluding girls from soccer competition with males is
an unconstitutional denial of equal educational opportunity).
19. See, e.g., Reed v. Nebraska Sch. Activities Ass'n, 341 F. Supp. 258 (D. Neb. 1972)
(enjoining enforcement of rule prohibiting females from participating with males in golf and
basketball). See also Giplin v. Kansas State High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 377 F. Supp. 1233 (D.
Kan. 1974) (striking rule prohibiting males and females from competing on same athletic team
in interscholastic contest).
20. Bednar v. Nebraska Sch. Activities Ass'n, 531 F.2d 922 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding
girls cannot be excluded from cross-country competition and that girls and boys should not be
prohibited from competing on the same team). See also, Haas v. South Bend Community Sch.
Corp., 289 N.E.2d 495 (Ind. 1972), abrogatedon othergrounds by Collins v. Day, 644 N.E.2d
72 (Ind. 1994) (holding girls cannot be excluded from non-contact sports such as golf,
swimming, tennis, track and gymnastics).
21. Compare Attorney General v. Massachusetts Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, Inc.,
393 N.E.2d 284, 292 (Mass. 1979) (concluding that excluding boys from participating in a
particular sport, even when athletic opportunities are equal or greater for boys, can be a
violation of equal protection), with Clark v. Arizona Interscholastic Ass'n, 695 F.2d 1126, 1127,
1131 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that the equal protection violation that applies when girls are
excluded does not extend to males because the government does not have an interest in eliminating discrimination against boys in athletics. The court viewed the exclusion of males as
furthering the goal of redressing past discrimination and providing equal opportunities for

19981

THROWING LIKE A GIRL

This article begins by examining various approaches to dealing with
sexual discrimination in sports. Part I provides the historical background of
and legislative intent of Title IX. 22 Part II examines the requirement of state
action. Part III addresses proposed justifications for allowing discrimination
on the basis of sex. Part IV discusses how the separate but equal standard has
been applied to athletic programs. Part V examines the exclusion of boys from
girls' athletic teams. Although many areas within athletics are affected by
gender discrimination, including sports programs for children,23 high school
sports programs, college athletics,24 amateur athletics,25 professional sports,26

females); see also Hoover v. Meiklejohn, 430 F. Supp. 164 (D.C. Colo. 1977) (holding that
given the lack of athletic opportunity for girls in past years, separation of teams may promote
the legitimate purpose of encouraging their involvement. As such, it may also justify sanctioning some sports only for females).
22. Education Amendments of 1972, supra note 1.
23. National Org. of Women v. Little Leagues, 318 A.2d 33 (N.J. 1974) (rejecting the
argument that resources should be expended solely on boys who could use the training to
develop permanent baseball skill, the court held that developing "manhood" was no different
from the way "womanhood" should be developed, by developing character and sportsmanship
or sportswomanship).
24. See, e.g., Kelley v. Board of Trustees, 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that
termination of the men's swimming program while retaining the women's swimming program
did not violate Title IX or the equal protection clause because men's participation in athletics
was more than proportionate to their percentage of the student body). See also Cohen v. Brown
University, 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996) (ruling that Brown University violated Title IX by
demoting its women's gymnastics and volleyball teams from varsity status).
25. See Lafler v. Athletic Bd. of Control, 536 F. Supp. 104, 107 (W.D. Mich. 1982)
(ruling against a woman who sought to compete in boxing matches with men because there was
no league for women). The court stated that the plaintiff admitted that she wore a protective
covering for her breasts which was clearly prohibited by Rule Six, Article 9 of the Amateur
Boxing Federation Rules and that the same rule requires contestants to wear a protective cup.
Id. at 106. The opinion failed to consider that the rule was based on male anatomy, therefore
not a justification for discrimination but an example of it. Id.
26. See, e.g., Matthew J. McPhillips, "Girls of Summer": A Comprehensive Analysis
of the Past, Present, and Future of Women in Baseball and a Roadmap to Litigating a
Successfil GenderDiscriminationCase, 6 SEToN HALL J. SPORT L. 301, 302 (1996) (featuring
in part, The Colorado Silver Bullets). See also New York State Div. of Human Rights v. New
York-Pennsylvania Prof'I Baseball League, 36 A.D.2d 364, 320 N.Y.S.2d 788 (1971) (finding
sex discrimination when the national association of baseball leagues refused to hire a woman
who was 5 feet 2 inches tall and weighed 129 pounds). The court found that standards of
requiring umpires to be 5 feet 10 inches and weigh at least 170 pounds bore no reasonable
relation to the requirements of the job of umpiring, yet served to bar more than 99 percent of
all women from consideration. Id. at 793. Furthermore, evidence indicated that male
professional baseball umpires in both the major and minor leagues who had failed to meet the
height and weight standards were hired and performance was not impaired. Id. at 794.
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media coverage,27 employment,2" and coaching,29 this comment focuses on
discrimination in high school sports programs. Finally, this comment
concludes that the preferable solution is not to look at whether separate teams
are permissible, but rather to examine whether they are truly equal while
keeping in mind the goal to further the educational opportunities and athletic
experiences of both sexes.
I.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The stated purpose of interscholastic athletics is to provide students with
an opportunity to cultivate good habits and to develop mental and physical
abilities, equally beneficial to both girls and boys.3 ° When interscholastic
athletic programs discriminate against girls, schools violate Title IX and the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.3 ' Even prior to the
passage of Title IX, athletic programs were recognized as an important part
of the educational process and subject to the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.32 Under an Equal Protection analysis, it has been

27. Women's Sports Foundation, supra note 2, at 4 (reporting that sports stories about
women account for only 3.5% of all sports stories in a study of USA Today, the Boston Globe,
the Orange County Register, and the Dallas Morning News). Ninety-four percent of television
news sports coverage goes to men's sports. In fifty-two weeks of Sports Illustrated (2/93-2/94),
six women were awarded cover shots. The first was in a bathing suit. The second, had a knife
in her back. The third and fourth were widows of baseball players. The fifth was a tennis player
who was featured because she feared her father. The sixth was Nancy Kerrigan after she was
attacked. Id.
28. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The clearest prohibitions of Title VII
relate to sex discrimination in the area of employment. Id.
29. See Wynn v. Columbus Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 692 F. Supp. 672 (N.D. Miss.
1988) (finding a female coach had been discriminated against when the school board passed her
over for Athletic Director in favor of a less-qualified male); Equal Employment Opportunity
Comm'n v. Madison Community Unit Sch. Dist., 1986 WL 613 (S.D. 11. 1986); see also
Women's Sports Foundation, supra note 2 (reporting that head coaches of women's basketball
average only 59% of the salary of head coaches of men's basketball). Furthermore, between
1974 and 1975, coaching positions for college women's teams increased 185 percent; 182
percent of the new positions went to men and 3 percent went to women. Id. See also Ann
Marie Dobosz et al., How Are We Doing?,Ms. Magazine, Volume VIII, No. 2, at 22 (stating
that in 1972, more than 90% of coaches of college women's sports teams and administrators of
women's sports programs were women). By 1996, the percentage of coaches of women's
college teams that were women had dropped to 47.7%, and the percentage of administrators that
were women had dropped to 18.5%). Id.
30. Haas v. South Bend Community Sch. Corp., 289 N.E.2d 495,499-500 (Ind. 1973),
abrogatedon other grounds by Collins v. Day, 644 N.E.2d 72 (Ind. 1994).
31. See infra notes 32-4 and accompanying text.
32. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 91 S. Ct. 1267,
reh'g denied, 403 U.S. 912, 91 S. Ct. 2200 (1971); Caddo Parish Sch. Bd. v. United States, 88
S. Ct. 67 (1967).
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held that exclusion of girls from contact sports in order to protect them from
33
injury is not substantially related to any justifiable governmental interest.
What Title IX adds is the general rule that an institution covered by the Act
34
is forbidden from discriminating on the basis of sex in athletics. Title IX
provides:
[W]here a recipient [of federal funds] operates or sponsors
a team in a particular sport for members of one sex but
operates or sponsors no such team for members of the other
sex, and athletic opportunities for members of that sex have
previously been limited, members of the excluded sex must
team offered unless the sport
be allowed to try out for the
35
sport.
contact
a
is
involved
36
To fall within Title X a school must receive federal assistance.
Title IX allows schools receiving federal funds the discretion to determine for
37
themselves how best to provide equality of athletic opportunity. In order to
comply with Title IX schools must show: (1) they have provided opportunities for males and females in numbers that proportionately represent their
respective enrollments; (2) they have a history of expanding programs in
response to female's developing interests and abilities in sports; or (3) they
3
have fully and effectively accommodated female's interests and abilities. "

The underlying purpose of Title IX and similar legislation
addressing sex discrimination is to emancipate women and
girls from stereotypes and limiting conceptions that are
39
discordant with their needs, capabilities and aspirations.
This is in sharp contrast with decisions such as State v.

33. Leffel v. Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 444 F. Supp. 1117, 1122 (E.D.
Wis. 1978) (discussing alternatives such as providing coeducational teams, dropping all of the
teams, or establishing separate girls' teams for contact sports).
34. Title IX states that "no person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any educational program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." Education
Amendments of 1972, supra note 1.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. See also Yellow Springs Exempted Village Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Ohio
High School Athletic Ass'n, 647 F.2d 651 (6th Cir. 1981) (holding that an athletic association's
rule prohibiting girls from participating on boys' teams in any contact sport violated Title IX
because the rule took from the schools their power to determine how best to provide equal
athletic opportunity).
38. John Gibeaut, supra note 5, at 40.
39. See National Organization for Women v. Little Leagues, 318 A.2d 33 (N.J. 1974).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 18

Hunter4" which approved of the legislature's use of the
state's police power to "halt this ever-increasing feminine
encroachment upon what for ages had been considered
strictly as manly arts and privileges.'
The Supreme Court has determined that gender-based classifications are
to be analyzed under an intermediate level scrutiny.42 Thus, the gender-based
classification must serve important governmental objectives that are
substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.43 Gender-based
classifications may be upheld if the purpose of the discrimination is to redress
past discrimination." However, gender-based classifications will not be
upheld if they are solely for administrative convenience or if they reflect
archaic or over-broad generalizations that promote sexual stereotypes about
the proper roles of men and women.45 Unfortunately, the highly deferential
treatment given to schools often conflicts with the legislative intent of
removing stereotyped conceptions and limitations placed on girls both in
general and in athletics specifically.
ANALYSIS

II.

STATE ACTION

To bring an action under Title IX, facts must be alleged sufficiently to
support a finding of a state action.46 In Brenden v. Independent School
40. 300 P.2d 455 (Or. 1956).
41. Id. at 458.
42. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (holding that rational basis requires that
classification be reasonable, not arbitrary and must rest on some ground that has a fair and
substantial relation to the object of the legislation so that all similarly situated persons are
treated alike).
43. Polly Woods, Comment, Boys Muscling in on Girls' Sports, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 891,
893 (1992) (noting that the standard leaves considerable room for judicial discretion). Some
commentators feel that this is harmful because school administrators, and the judiciary both, are
predominantly made up of white males who come from an age in which women were
discouraged from careers to the extent that it was said that "[t]he harmony, not to say the
identity, of interests and views which belong, or should belong, to the family institution [are]
repugnant to the idea of a woman adopting a distinct and independent career from that of her
husband." See Croudace and Desmarais, supra note 10, at 1437 (citing Bradwell v. State, 83
U.S. 130, 141 (1872)).
44. Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 318 (1977).
45. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982);
Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 216-17 (1977); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684
(1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971).
46. Jane C. Avery, Annotation, Validity, UnderFederalLaw, of Sex Discriminationin
Athletics, 23 A.L.R. Fed. 664, 688 (1975).
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District47 the Minnesota Court of Appeals weighed the following factors in
determining whether a state action existed: (1) whether the public schools are
members of a league; (2) whether expenses are paid from the revenues of
games, played at state-owned facilities; (3) whether the governing boards of
the associations are composed of public school officials, or others who are
paid or supervised by the state; and (4) whether the schools provide coaches,
athletic equipment, insurance for players or facilities, or transportation.48
Once the requisite state action is found, the exclusion of one sex from
enjoyment of equal privileges in places of public accommodation is actionable
as sex discrimination under Title IX. 49
At times, courts find the requisite state action is not met. For example,
in Jr. Football Ass'n v. Gaudet,5 ° the Texas Court of Appeals denied an
injunction that would have allowed a girl to play football on the boys' football
team on the basis that there was not a sufficient state action.5 The court's
finding of no state action goes against the reasoning in Brenden,52 considering
that the team was chartered by the state as a nonprofit corporation, its players
practiced on school grounds, and its games were held in a city park. 3
Following the reasoning in Brenden; the Illinois court in
Bucha v. Illinois High School Ass'n 54 held that there was
sufficient state action when an athletic association included
members of tax-supported public institutions and conducted
sporting events in facilities which benefited from taxpayer
expenses.55 Because there was sufficient state involvement,
the association was subject to equal protection requirements
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 6
The state statute involved in National Organizationfor Women v. Little
League, Inc.57 allowed access to certain public places to be limited to one sex

47.

477 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973).

50.

Junior Football Ass'n v. Gaudet, 546 S.W.2d 70 (Tex. App. 1976).

48.
49.
51.

Id. at 1295-1296.
See Avery, supra note 46, at §1.
Id. at 71.

52. Brenden v. Independent Sch. Dist., 477 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973).
53. Junior Football Ass'n v. Gaudet, 546 S.W.2d at 70-71 (Tex. App. 1976).
54. 351 F. Supp. 69 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
55. Id. at 73 (finding that sporting events conducted in facilities which were
constructed, operated, and maintained at taxpayer expense was sufficient to constitute state
action).

56. Id.
57.

318 A.2d 33 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974).
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if the place was by its nature reasonably restricted to individuals of one sex. 8
The association argued that the sporting league fell within this exception
because the league was by its very nature reasonably restricted to boys. 9 The
court rejected this argument, holding that the statute was limited to facilities
which provide for the changing of clothing or performing of bodily functions
and did not apply to sports fields.'

M.

JUSTIFICATIONS FOR EXCLUSION

Some of the arguments advanced as justification for barring girls from
participating on boys' athletic teams include: (a) separation of sexes as a
tradition in sports; (b) prevention of physical harm to females; (c) prevention
of psychological damage to the players; (d) costs involved in allowing girls to
compete with boys; (e) development of separate girls' programs; and (f)
because playing sports is not a right, but merely a privilege.
A.

SEPARATION OF SEXES AS TRADITION IN SPORTS

Past findings demonstrate that an argument based on tradition should
easily fail. 6 ' Because classifications have been found unconstitutional if they
reinforce a stereotype, or are byproducts of traditional ways of thinking about
women, or have a stigmatic effect on one gender, tradition alone does not
justify separating the sexes.6 2 Likewise, it has been held that stereotypes
which portray women as unable to perform physical tasks as well as men are
not enough to justify differences in treatment.63

58. Id. at 35 (involving a state statute which prohibited denial in places of public
accommodation of any accommodations, advantages, facilities, or privileges on account of race,
creed, color, national origin, ancestry, marital status, or sex, except in the case of sex, where the
place of public accommodation was in its nature reasonably restricted exclusively to individuals
of one sex).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 38 (noting that the only time Little League would be restricted by sex would
be in the areas in which changing of clothing took place). However, at the Little League level,
even this did not apply because the children changed clothing at home, not at the game site. Id.
61. See infra notes 62-3.
62. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724-25; Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S.
268 (1979); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977).
63. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (quoting concurrence of
Bradley, J., in Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1873)) (stating that goals which
are based on paternalistic notions that men are protectors of women should be struck down as
perpetuating the stereotype of women as fragile creatures, needing special treatment).
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PREVENTION OF PHYSICAL HARM TO FEMALES

Some courts have found the second justification, preventing physical
harm to athletes, sufficiently important to withstand intermediate scrutiny
based on an interest in the health, safety, and welfare of citizens.' As such,
schools have been able to restrain girls from playing contact sports on boys'
65
teams precisely because they are girls. Other courts have found girls cannot
be excluded from contact sports, such as football, wrestling, and soccer,
66
because exclusion violates girls' equal protection rights and Title IX.
any more
Extensive expert testimony has found girls as a class are not
67 Because
subject to injury while playing contact sports than are boys.
possibility of physical injury is no greater for girls than for boys, the court in
68
Leffel v. Wisconsin InterscholasticAthletic Ass'n ruled that excluding girls
69
from contact sports was not justified. The Leffel court opined that no
objective whatsoever justified providing boys with the opportunity to
participate in interscholastic competition in contact sports while absolutely

64. See, e.g., Yellow Springs Exempted Village Sch. Dist. of Educ. v. Ohio High Sch.
F. Supp.
Athletic Ass'n, 647 F.2d 651 (6th Cir. 1981); Bucha v. Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 351
1974).
Ohio
(N.D.
1396
Supp.
F.
411
69 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Clinton v. Nagy,
65. Id.
66. See Saint v. Nebraska Sch. Activities Ass'n, 684 F. Supp. 626 (D.C. Neb. 1988)
(ruling that the school district must allow a high school girl to try out for the boys' wrestling
team where the school did not have a girls' wrestling program because there was no substantial
relationship between the prohibition and the asserted goal of protecting girls from harm);
from
Hoover v. Meiklejohn, 430 F. Supp. 164 (D.C. Colo. 1977) (holding that excluding girls
was
participate
to
permitted
were
students
male
which
in
competitions
participating in soccer
House of
an unconstitutional denial of equal educational opportunity); Opinion of Justices to
and
Representatives, 371 N.E.2d 426 (1977) (finding a proposed bill that would bar females
the
males from participating together in football and wrestling unconstitutional because
sex
on
solely
based
classifications
which
to
scrutiny
close
the
survive
not
prohibition could
must be subjected).
67. See Comment, Sex Discrimination in InterscholasticHigh School Athletics, 25
on
SYRACUSE L. REV. 535, 548-51 (1974) (citing State Department of Education, Report
1972)
(Feb.,
1970
June
1969
Mar.
Teams,"
Athletic
Interschool
Boys
on
"Girls
Experiment:
which found no physical harm to females competing against male athletes); see also Comment,
Equality in Athletics: The Cheerleaderv. The Athlete, 19 S.D. L. Rev. 428, 441-42 (1974)
(finding no physical harm to males or females participating on the same athletic team).
68. 444F. Supp. 1117 (1978).
69. Id. at 1122. See also National Organization for Women v. Little Leagues, 318 A.2d
33 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974) (finding substantial credible evidence that during the years
eight through twelve, girls match boys in size and physical potential, eliminating any reasons
for excluding girls); see also Force v. Pierce City R-VI Sch. Dist., 570 F. Supp. 1020 (W.D.
Mo. 1983) (invalidating a rule excluding girls from competing with boys for a place on the
football team because girls were subjected to a fitness screening in order to weed out physically
unfit girls but boys were not subject to the same fitness screening).
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denying the same opportunity to girls.7" Likewise, the court in Lantz v.
Ambach7" concluded that regulations prohibiting girls from trying out for the
football team were overbroad and unconstitutional because they did not
prevent "weak" males from playing football.7 2 These decisions demonstrate
that exclusion of females premised on promoting safety of individuals is
suspect when applied only against girls as a class.
There is even less support for prohibiting girls from competing on boys'
teams when the sport is a noncontact sport. Considering that the composition
of women, like men, includes individuals with widely differing athletic
abilities, the court in Brenden v. Independent School Districtconcluded there
is no rational basis for disallowing "mixed competition" in noncontact
sports." 3 When evaluating factors involved in noncontact sports, such as
coordination, concentration, agility and timing, the court found no evidence
that males outperform females.74 In fact, studies demonstrate that women
have the capacity for greater endurance and stamina than men.75
The idea that males are superior athletes based on physical features is
challenged by increasing numbers of female athletes whose abilities exceed
those of most men and in many cases approach those of the most talented
men.76 Further, some argue that male advantage in sports is primarily due to
the fact that males have a longer history of participation, rather than to any
physical advantage.77 Other commentators suggest that the competitive
advantage of males over females in athletics is due to the fact that girls and
boys have been socialized differently toward involvement in sports.78 One
study found that females are prevented from competing against males for the
sole reason that it is not yet socially acceptable for a female to defeat a male

70. Id.
71. 620 F. Supp. 663 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
72. Lantz v. Ambach, 620 F. Supp. 663 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding that girls must be
allowed to try out for the football team because the state regulation prohibiting all female
participation on men's teams in basketball, boxing, football, ice hockey, rugby, and wrestling
was overbroad and unconstitutional).
73. See Brenden v. Independent Sch. Dist., 477 F.2d 1292, 1300 (8th Cir. 1973)
(finding opinions that females shouldn't compete with men were based on conclusions by
individuals unfamiliar with mixed competition and such opinions were based on stereotyped
notions about the sexes).
74. Id. (holding that there is no reason to exclude females from competing, and that
females are entitled to an individualized determination of their ability). Id. at 1300.
75. See, e.g., Attorney Gen. v. Massachusetts Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 393 N.E.2d
284, 293 (Mass. 1979) (examining various studies which demonstrate females have higher
endurance levels and lower injury rates than do males).
76. Id. See also Croudace and Desmarais, supra note 10, at 1446.
77. Id.
78. Woods, supra note 43, at 895.
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in athletic competition.79 These propositions weaken the perception that male
advantage is due to limitations of the female body.
In sum, many males are allowed to compete even though they are more
fragile and injury-prone than females who wish to compete. Since regulations
do not prevent these males from participating in sports with other males, the
separation is not furthering the stated goal of protecting allegedly weaker
athletes from stronger ones. 0 Because females are no more susceptible to

physical injuries than males, s ' there is no additional risk in allowing females
to compete against males. There is no clear connection between protecting

girls from injury and forbidding girls to compete with boys. Rather, the

classification is based on protecting fragile women, an illogical idea based in
patriarchy.82
C.

PREVENTION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL DAMAGE TO THE PLAYERS

Even though courts have ruled that the third justification, psychological
factors, does not justify separate teams,83 reasoning based on this justification
is still evident. For example, the opinion in Bucha v. Illinois High School
Ass'n"'was based in part on the psychological differences between male and
female athletes.8" However, nowhere in the court's opinion are the alleged
psychological differences discussed, or even mentioned. 6 Without saying
what the psychological differences are, the court found them to be sufficient
to prohibit competition between high school girls and boys, to conduct girls'
sporting programs differently from boys', and to impose restrictions on girls
only.87
79. Brenden v. Independent Sch. Dist., 477 F.2d 1292, 1301. (8th Cir. 1973) (citing
State Department of Education, Report on Experiment: "Girls on Boys Interscholastic Athletic
Teams," Mar. 1969 - June 1970, 1 (Feb., 1972)).
80. Leffel v. Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 444 F. Supp. at 1117; Hoover
v. Meiklejohn, 430 F. Supp. 164 (D.C. Colo. 1977); Clinton v. Nagy, 411 F. Supp. 1396 (N.D.
Ohio 1974); Darrin v. Gould, 540 P.2d 882 (Wash. 1975).
81. Darrin v. Gould, 540 P.2d 882, at 892 (finding that even in contact sports, risk of
serious injury to female reproductive organs and breasts is less than the risk of injury to male
organs; male genitals are far more exposed, whereas the uterus is extremely "shock-resistant").
82. See Fontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) ('Traditionally...
discrimination was rationalized by an attitude of 'romantic paternalism' which, in practical
effect, put women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage.").
83. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); National
Organization for Women v. Little League, 318 A.2d 33 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974).
84. 351 F. Supp. 69 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
85. Id. at 74.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 71 (upholding restrictions which included a prohibition on cheering for girls'
sports, a one dollar limitation on the value of awards, and a prohibition on overnight trips in
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The objective of preventing psychological harm concerns the effect on
members of one sex who lose in competition with members of the opposite
sex. This justification is based entirely on the type of "archaic and overbroad"
generalizations which have been denounced by the Supreme Court in
Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan."8 The theory is that males suffer
psychological harm when they lose to females because females have been
considered inferior for so long. 9 To allow separation based on fear of males
losing to females wrongfully excludes females and reinforces the notion that
they are unworthy opponents."°
D.

FINANCIAL COSTS INVOLVED IN ALLOWING GIRLS TO COMPETE WITH BOYS

A fourth justification has been that states have a financial interest in
excluding girls from athletic teams or in not having to establish separate girls'
teams.91 In Haas v. South Bend Community School Corp.,92 the court ruled
expense alone is not a justifiable reason for denying one-half of high school
students the opportunity to participate in interscholastic sports.9 3 While
recognizing the interests of girls outweigh the school's interest in saving
money, the court in Petrie v. Illinois High School Ass'n 94 recognized that
public schools often have limited funds. However, to arrange sports programs
in such a way that denies girls the chance to be on a team does not foster equal
opportunities as required by Title IX.95 Unfortunately, providing comparable
programs may at times require athletic departments to reduce costs by
eliminating certain activities. The decision of which programs and activities
to eliminate will be scrutinized to ensure that schools comply with Title IX. 96
conjunction with girls' competition).
88. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
89. Croudace and Desmarais, supra note 10, at 1442-1443 (citing Hollander v.

Connecticut Interscholastic Athletic Conference, Civil No. 12-49-27, slip op. at 8 (Conn. Super.
Ct. March 29, 1971)).
90. id.(noting also, that it is not clear that females suffer psychological harm when they
lose in athletic competition with males). Rather, the claim that females would be
psychologically harmed by competition with males is based on the stereotype of women as less
competitive and less able to deal with failure. Id. at 1443.
91. See, e.g., Haas v. South Bend Community Sch. Corp., 289 N.E.2d 495 (Ind. 1972),
abrogated on other grounds by Collins v. Day, 644 N.E.2d 72 (Ind. 1994).
92. 289 N.E.2d 495 (Ind. 1972).
93.

Id.

94. 394 N.E.2d 855 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979).
95. Id. at 989.
96. See Cohen v. Brown Univ., 809 F. Supp. 978 (D.R.I. 1992), aff'd, 991 F.2d 888
(1993) (holding that two women's teams must be restored to varsity status in order for Brown
University to comply with Title IX because the men's varsity teams provided opportunities for
more than sixty percent of all athletes whereas women's teams served less than forty percent of
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DEVELOPMENT OF SEPARATE GIRLS' PROGRAMS

Some courts find the fifth justification, excluding girls from participating
on boys teams in order to develop stronger girls' teams, acceptable. For
example, the United States Supreme Court in O'Connor v. Board of
Education97 held that sex-based discrimination is needed in order to prevent
boys from dominating girls sports.9" The Court reasoned that without a
gender-based classification in contact sports, there is a risk that boys will
participate in girls' programs, dominating those programs and denying girls

an opportunity to compete in sports. 9

The Haas v. South Bend Community School Corp. court also looked at
the argument that without gender-based teams, boys would be permitted to try
out for girls' teams, which would result in both teams being composed of
mostly males."° The court found the concern for the welfare of girls' athletic
programs to be admirable.'0° However, upon further examination the court
found the majority of schools in the state of Indiana did not maintain
interscholastic athletic programs for female students."°2 Therefore, the court
held that gender-based teams could not be justified as a protection of girls'
athletic programs until comparable girls' programs were established." 3
F.

PLAYING SPORTS IS NOT A RIGHT, BUT MERELY A PRIVILEGE

The sixth justification for the exclusion of girls from boys' teams is that
girls have no right to play. This argument is based on the view that participation in sports, unlike education, is a privilege and not a right."° In Bucha the

the university's athletes). See also Diane Heckman, Women & Athletics: A Twenty Year
Retrospective on Title IX, 9 U. Miami Ent. & Sports L. Rev. 1, 26 (1992); see also Myth
Busting, supra note 5 (noting that if a sport is revenue-producing or has more spectators, these
facts cannot be used as an excuse for treating male athletes better than female athletes). Noting
also, that at 80% of all colleges, the football program loses money. Id.
97. 449 U.S. 1301 (1980).
98. Id. (prohibiting an eleven-year-old girl from playing on the sixth grade boys team
even though her skills had been rated by a professional basketball coach as equal or better than
those of a female high school sophomore player or a male eighth-grade player).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 500.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 499.
103. Id. at 500.
104. Bucha v. Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 351 F. Supp. 69, 75 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (noting that
Congress, in enacting Title VII, decided that employment was too important an interest to be
protected solely by the Equal Protection Clause, whereas girls' interscholastic swimming
contests had not similarly been accorded such protection).
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court found prohibitions on girls' sports teams to be acceptable, in part,
because participation in interscholastic swimming contests have not been
accorded constitutional protection." 5 Responding to the same argument, the
° held
court in Reed v. Nebraska School Activities Ass'n""
the proper issue is
not whether a plaintiff has a "right" to play sports, but whether she can be
treated differently from boys in an activity provided by the state. 1 7 The court
found no rational basis to support discrimination which denies girls the value
of competition, enhancement of reputation, and instructional benefits of the
school coaching staff. 8
Similarly, the court in Hoover v. Meiklejohn"'9 held that while there is
no constitutional requirement for schools to provide athletic programs, it is
required that whatever opportunities are made available by schools be
available to all on equal terms."' Therefore, under the reasoning of Reed and
Hoover,the Bucha court misconstrued the issue. The real issue is whether the
state can treat girls and boys differently, not whether there is a constitutional
right to play a particular sport.
Upon examining the stated justifications for separation of the sexes it
becomes apparent that most are deeply flawed. However, the fifth justification, to encourage the development of separate girls' programs, is an
exception. Development of separate girls' programs is a valid and admirable
goal. However, courts should be cautious. Rules or laws appearing to be
valid and nondiscriminatory on their face must be struck down as a violation
of equal protection if they are discriminatory in operation."' Therefore, when
separation of the sexes serves to discourage female participation or perpetuate
limiting stereotypes about women, separation is not equal and courts must
remedy the injustice."'

105. Id.
106. 341 F. Supp. 258 (D. Neb. 1972).
107. Id. at 262.
108. Id. But see In re Calzadilla v. Dooley, 286 N.Y.S.2d 510 (1968) (holding that an
athletic commission's rule that "[n]o woman may compete in any wrestling or boxing contest
or exhibition and no woman may be licensed as a boxer, wrestler, manager or second" was valid
and therefore ruled that prohibiting a wrestling license to a female wrestler did not violate equal
protection as discrimination).
109. 430 F. Supp. 164 (D. Colo. 1977).
110. Id. at 169, 171 (stating that whether it be algebra or athletics, whatever
opportunities are provided must be open to all).
111. Haas, 289 N.E.2d at 499.
112. See Croudace and Desmarais, supra note 10, at 1427.
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IV.

"SEPARATE BUT EQUAL" TEAMS

Most courts hold that as long as a comparable girls' athletic team exists,
denying girls the right to be on the boys team does not violate the Equal
Protection Clause.' 3 However, where a comparable girls' athletic program
does not exist, regulations barring mixed competition do violate the Equal
Protection Clause." 4 Other courts disagree and find the separate but equal
standard to be invalid.1" 5 These courts hold that girls cannot be excluded from
competition on boys' teams and that state rules prohibiting competition of
6
girls and boys on the same athletic team should not be given effect." This is
especially true in non-contact sports such as golf, swimming, track, tennis, and
gymnastics." 7 Issues concerning "separate but equal" teams include physical
differences between males and females; requirements of the separate but equal

113. See Ritacco v. Norwin Sch. Dist., 361 F. Supp. 930 (W.D. Pa. 1973) (concluding
that "separate but equal" in competitive sports is justifiable where the opportunities for engaging
in sports are equal); Hoover v. Meiklejohn, 430 F. Supp. 164, 170 (D. Colo. 1977).
114. See Brenden v. Independent Sch. Dist., 477 F. 2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973); Haas, 289
N.E.2d 495 (holding that denying female student the opportunity to participate on the boys' golf
team violated her equal protection rights where she was prohibited from participating on the
only team provided).
115. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 334 A.2d
839, 842 (Pa. 1975) (stating that "even where separate teams are offered for boys and girls in
the same sport, the most talented girls still may be denied the right to play at that level of
competition which their ability might otherwise permit them. For a girl in that position, who
has been relegated to the 'girls' team', solely because of her sex, 'equality under the law' has
been denied."); Bednar v. Nebraska Sch. Activities Ass'n, 531 F.2d 922 (8th Cir. 1976) (finding
that upholding the separate but equal standard would be a denial of equal protection as
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment because girls' programs simply are not comparable
to those which exist for boys); see generally Morris v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 472 F.2d
1207, 1209 (noting that recent Michigan legislation requires girls be permitted to participate on
male teams even where a female team is offered).
116. Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 334 A.2d 839, 843
(Pa. 1975) (reasoning that if any individual girl is too weak, injury-prone, or unskilled, then she
may be excluded from competition on that basis but she cannot be excluded solely because of
her sex). See generally Darrin v. Gould, 540 P.2d 882, 877-888 (Wash. 1975) (agreeing with
the rationale of Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, supra, that
discrimination on account of sex is forbidden. Stating further, that rules forbidding qualified
girls from playing on the football team are invalid because girls have the right to participate as
members of that team. The court stated that this is all the more true when the school provides
no comparable girls' football team).
117. Haas,289 N.E.2d at 500 (opining that "no reasons have been presented, nor do any
exist, which justify denying female high school students the opportunity to qualify for
participation with male high school students in interscholastic athletic contests which do not
involve physical contact between the participants."); Brenden v. Independent Sch. Dist., 477
F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973) (striking down a state rule precluding female students from
participating on the men's tennis, cross-country skiing, and cross-country running teams).
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standard; reasons advanced by schools supporting separate but equal teams;
and alternatives to separate but equal teams. Each shall be examined in turn.
A.

PHYSICAL ATTRIBUTES AS SUPPORT FOR SEPARATE BUT EQUAL TEAMS

In finding that physiological differences between boys and girls justifies
separate but equal teams, the court in Bucha v. Illinois High School Ass'n
relied on testimony that (1) men are taller than women; (2) men have greater
muscle mass; (3) men have larger hearts and a deeper breathing capacity; and
(4) men can run faster.'
Following the reasoning of Bucha the court in
Ritacco v. Norwin School District"9 held that requiring separate girls' and
boys' teams did not violate the Equal Protection Clause when the purpose is
to enhance the quality, quantity and caliber of sports opportunities for girls
and boys.' 20
However, the very physiological differences relied upon by the court in
Bucha were rejected by the Minnesota Court of Appeals in Brenden v.
Independent School District2 ' which found such differences failed to
demonstrate that women are incapable of competing with men in sports. 122
The court stated that the witnesses testifying as to physiological differences
between the sexes were themselves unfamiliar with mixed competition, and
referred to a contrary study showing that mixed competition is overwhelm2
ingly favorable. 1
Noting that differences among individuals in both sexes is greater than
the differences between the sexes, the federal court in Hoover v. Meiklejohn 24
held that girls should not be denied team participation based on physical
attributes.1 21 The court found exclusion of girls to protect them from injury
to be unconstitutional.' 26 The failure to establish any criteria to protect small
or weak males from injury of competition with stronger or larger males
destroys any reasoning for separating the sexes. 27 Therefore, even if males

118. Brenden v. Independent Sch. Dist., 477 F.2d 1292 (1973).
119. 361 F. Supp. 930 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
120. Id. (upholding separate teams based on physical and psychological differences of
girls and boys).
121. 477 F.2d 1292 (1973).
122. Id. at 1300.
123. Id. at 1300-1301 (citing State Department of Education, Report on Experiment:
"Girls on Boys Interscholastic Athletic Teams," March 1969 - June 1970, 1 (February, 1972)).
124. 430 F. Supp. 164 (D. Colo. 1977).
125. Id. at 169.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 170.
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as a class have an advantage in strength and speed, under the Hoover and
Brenden decisions, there is no rationality in limiting such patronizing
protection to females only.
B.

THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE "SEPARATE BUT EQUAL" STANDARD

Because "separate but equal" teams remain constitutional, the question
becomes, What is the meaning of equal? 2 ' Teams that are found to be
substantially comparable in programs and receiving substantially equal
support will satisfy the equality of opportunity required by the Equal
Protection Clause. 2 9 As such, the standard requires opportunities to be equal,
not necessarily identical. 3 °
Regulations imposing different rules on girls' basketball, such as halfcourt, six-player restrictions, and permitting only forwards to shoot, were
upheld as equal in Cape v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass'n.''
2
Conversely, the court in Dodson v. Arkansas Activities Ass'n'1 held that the
association and school districts must extend the benefits of physical training
with similar rules for girls and boys.' 33 Considering that differences in rules
can limit experiences, opportunities, and mastery of a sport which can lead to
scholarship opportunities for students, 34 the Dodson court has made the more
reasonable and just ruling.
Comparable programs include comparable facilities, equipment,
supplies, uniforms, coaches, tutors, playing time, practice time, medical care,
and publicity.'35 Under this description of equivalent programs, it is surprising
36
that the court in Magill v. Avonworth Baseball Conference' found the
baseball conference did not have to allow girls to play because girls could play
37 A more
informal "sandlot" games or on an area girls' softball team.'
reasonable ruling was handed down in Israel v. Secondary School Activities
Commission. 38 In Israel, the West Virginia court held that it was wrong for
128.

129.

See Hoover v. Meiklejohn, 430 F. Supp. 164, 170 (D. Colo. 1977).
Id.

130. Id.
131. 563 F.2d 793 (6th Cir. 1977).
132. 468 F. Supp. 394 (E.D. Ark. 1979).
133. Id. at 399.
134. See Hoover v. Meiklejohn, 430 F. Supp. 164, 167 (D. Colo. 1977).
135. See Diane Heckman, Women & Athletics: A Twenty Year Retrospective on Title IX,
9 U. Miami Ent. & Sports L. Rev. 1 (1992).
136. 364 F. Supp. 1212 (W.D. Pa. 1973), vacated, 497 F.2d 921 (3rd Cir. 1974), affd
516 F.2d 1328 (3rd Cir. 1975).
137. Id. at 121,4.
138. 388 S.E.2d 480 (W. Va. 1989); see also Double Play in Virginia: High School
Legislation, WOMEN SPORTS PAGEs, March 1991, at 3 (reporting that in 1991, the Virginia High
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a high school female to be prohibited from playing on the boys' baseball team
where only softball was provided for females. 3 9 The court correctly
determined that Title IX was violated, because the games of baseball and
softball were not equivalent and did not provide girls and boys with equal
athletic opportunities."
At times, courts must look beyond the program itself in determining
whether it is truly equal. For example, even though facilities, funding and
coaching were equal for both the boys' and girls' basketball leagues, the court
in Michigan Departmentof Civil Rights v. Waterford Township Department
of Parksand Recreation'4 ' found the separate programs were unequal, because
girls who played on the football team were required to choose between
playing football or basketball, a choice the boys did not have to make.' 42
Forcing girls to choose between sports results in lost opportunities to play
sports of their preference, reduced opportunities to obtain college athletic
scholarships, and emotional distress from unequal treatment. 43
C.

EXAMINATION OF REASONS ADVANCED BY SCHOOLS IN SUPPORT OF
SEPARATE, EQUAL TEAMS

At times, courts also must look beyond the stated reasons for creating
separate teams. The rationale given should be examined to ensure that it is not
merely an "after the fact justification" for a policy founded upon stereotypical
conceptions.'" For example, in Gilpin v. Kansas State High School Activities
Ass'n' 45 the association argued that if girls were allowed to participate on
boys' teams, unlimited participation by boys would necessarily follow and
result in the demise of girls' competition.
The court found the objective of
advancing girls' interscholastic competition to be commendable and
legitimate.'47 However, because no girls' team existed, the court found that
a rule prohibiting mixed competition did not merely prevent girls from
School League changed a rule so as to allow females to play on the varsity baseball team,
recognizing the difference between baseball and softball).
139. Id. at 485.
140. Id.
141. 335 N.W.2d 204 (Mich. App. 1983).
142. Id. at 208.
143. See Alston v. Virginia High Sch. League, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 220, 221 (W.D. Va.
1997).
144. Croudace and Demarais, supra note 10 (discussing the possibility that separate
programs do provide females opportunities and benefits not provided by coeducational teams,
while noting that the possibility of nebulous rationales should be examined).
145. 377 F. Supp. 1233 (D. Kan. 1973).
146. Id. at 1237-1238.
147. Id. at 1243.
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48
competing on boys' teams but completely barred girls from participation.
Because the rule barred participation solely on the basis of sex without regard
to individual qualifications, the court held that the prohibition was not related
to the stated objective of advancing separate but equal teams.' 49
At times, discovering the actual reasons behind a policy does not require
very close examination. For example, State v. Hunter 50 involved a case in
which a female was accused of participating in a wrestling competition in
violation of a state statute which provided that no person other than males
should participate in any wrestling competition or exhibition.' In declaring
the statute constitutional, the court stated that the legislature, composed
predominantly of men, obviously had intended that there be "at least one
island on the sea of' 2life reserved for man that would be impregnable to the
assault of woman."'
The court in Brenden v. Independent School District15 cautions that sexbased classifications may be based on outdated stereotypes. 5 4 Therefore,
courts must be particularly sensitive to invidious discrimination when making
evaluations and must be particularly demanding in ascertaining whether a
substantial basis for the sex-based classification has been shown."' 5

D.

ALTERNATIVES TO SEPARATE BUT EQUAL TEAMS

Alternatives to having two gender-based separate but equal teams
include having three teams (one female, one male, and one based on ability);
56
two teams, one with a gender-based quota; or one gender-neutral team.'
Three teams, one based on ability and the other two segregated by sex,
would allow the most talented athletes to compete together regardless of sex,
while at the same time providing equal opportunity for both sexes. However,
as the courts in Petrie v. Illinois High School Ass'n and Haas v. South Bend
148. Id.
149. h at 1243; see also Haas, 289 N.E.2d 495 (holding that justification for separate
teams does not exist when only one athletic program is provided).
150. State v. Hunter, 300 P.2d 455 (Or. 1956).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 458.
153. 477 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973).
154. Id. at 1300.
155. Id.
156. Croudace and Desmarais, supra note 10 (arguing that separate and equal teams
promote sexual equality better than the other alternatives). See also Woods, supra note 43
(citing Attorney Gen. v. Massachusetts Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, Inc., 393 N.E.2d 284, 290
(Mass. 1979) (proposing other possible approaches such as using standards based on height,
weight, or skill, a system of handicapping, or limiting the number of boys allowed to participate
on the girls' team).
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Community School Corp. have recognized, most schools do not have the
57
necessary funding to support three teams.
Providing two teams and allowing girls to participate on the boys' team
if they qualify based on ability is another alternative. The Court in O'Connor
v. Boardof Education recognized that allowing seventh-grade students to try
out for eighth-grade teams, without the eighth-grade students having
reciprocal rights, is based on fairness.' As the Court properly stated, this
indicates that boys may be required to compete with talented girls without
having reciprocal rights.'59 The Clarkv. Arizona InterscholasticAss'n' 6 court
feared that permitting boys to play on girls' teams could impede the progress
of girls' programs, which continue to suffer from great disparities compared
to the male programs.' 6' This is a valid concern. However, following the
reasoning in O'Connor,it is permissible to exclude boys from the girls team,
while allowing girls to play on the boys team if they so choose.
The O'Connor reasoning is further supported by Forte v. Board of
Education62 which held that males may be precluded from participation
because overall athletic opportunity for males has not been limited in the
past. 63 Furthermore, providing two separate teams but still allowing girls who
qualify based on ability to play on the boys' team is a sound alternative. This
6
is 'similar to the varsity system already upheld at most schools.'
Providing a gender-neutral team based on ability is another alternative.
However, a gender-neutral team would nonetheless discriminate in the sense
that more males than females would qualify, leading to male dominated teams
and less female participation. Were the opportunities for engaging in sports
equal, this would be less true. 165 As the court in Petriev. Illinois High School
Ass'n points out, it is because of the current inequality of athletic opportunity
that allowing boys to compete on girls' teams may diminish equality and
66
increase overall disparity of athletic opportunity.
After examining various alternatives to separate but equal teams, the
alternative of providing three teams appears to be the most ideal solution. If
157. Petrie v. Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 394 N.E.2d 855, 862 (I11.1979) (acknowledging
schools often have limited funds).
158. O'Connor v. Board of Educ., 449 U.S. 1301, at 1306, n.4 (1980).
159. Id. at 1306.
160. 886 F.2d 1191 (9th Cir. 1989).
161. Id.at 1192.
162. 431 N.Y.S.2d 321 (Sup. Ct. 1980).
163. Id. at 323.
164. O'Connor, 449 U.S. at 1306.
165. See id. (holding that sex-based discrimination is needed to prevent boys from
dominating girls' sports).
166. Petrie v. Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 394 N.E.2d 855 (Ill. 1979).
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a school cannot afford three teams, equal male and female teams should be
provided. Of course, if there is not enough interest to support a separate girls'
team, girls must be allowed to try out for the boys' team, as held in Lantz v.
Ambach and Force v. Pierce City R-VI School District167 When two teams are
provided, girls should be authorized to participate on the male team if they
qualify. This is a less than perfect alternative, however, because it takes
quality players from the female team and possibly lowers the image of athletes
who play on the girls' team.168
V.

EXCLUSION OF BOYS FROM GIRLS' ATHLETIC TEAMS

While courts generally conclude the Equal Protection Clause prevents
schools from excluding girls from boys' athletic teams when there is no
corresponding girls' team,'" courts have often refused to extend the same
protection to boys. 7 ° It has been reasoned that athletic opportunities have not
previously been limited for members of their sex, as required under Title IX,
therefore boys may be excluded from girls' programs. 7 Furthermore,
because the government has announced a strong interest in redressing past
discrimination against girls in athletics and promoting athletic opportunity to
girls,' the courts have applied the Equal Protection Clause to prohibit their
exclusion. Conversely, there is no similar government interest in eliminating

167. Lantz v. Ambach, 620 F. Supp. 663 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Force v. Pierce City R-VI
Sch. Dist., 570 F. Supp. 1020 (W.D. Mo. 1983).
168. Croudace and Demarais, supra note 10, at 1455-1456 (noting that female athletes
that do not qualify for the boys' team, or who chose to play on the girls' team, may by
comparison be deemed unexceptional, thereby lowering the image of those who play on the girls
team).
169. For cases permitting females to participate on male sports teams, see generally
Brenden v. Independent Sch. Dist., 477 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973); Morris v. Michigan State
Bd. of Educ., 472 F.2d 1207 (6th Cir. 1973); Saint v. Nebraska Sch. Activities Ass'n, 684 F.
Supp. 626 (D. Neb. 1988); Lantz v. Ambach, 620 F. Supp. 663 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Force v.
Pierce City, 570 F. Supp. 1020 (W.D. Mo. 1983); Leffel v. Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic
Ass'n, 444 F. Supp. 1117 (D. Wis. 1978); Hoover v. Meiklejohn, 430 F. Supp. 164 (D. Colo.
1977); Darrin v. Gould, 540 P.2d 882 (Wash. 1975).
170. See Clark v. Arizona Interscholastic Ass'n, 886 F.2d 1191 (9th Cir. 1989); Kleczek
v. Rhode Island Interscholastic League, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 951 (D. R.I. 1991); Petrie v. Illinois
High Sch. Ass'n, 394 N.E.2d 855 (Ill. 1979).
171. See, e.g., Kleczek v. Rhode Island Interscholastic League, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 951,
955 (1991) (upholding the exclusion of males from participating in girls' field hockey because
only female athletes, not males, had limited opportunities, such that they fall within the
protections of Title IX).
172. Woods, supra note 43 (stating that denying boys access to girls' sports has been
upheld as a means of fostering the important governmental interest in promoting athletic
opportunities for girls and redressing the disparate athletic opportunities available to girls and
boys).
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discrimination against boys in athletics, so equal protection has not been
73
applied.

1

The court in Clark v. Arizona InterscholasticAss'n, 174 held that boys
could be excluded in order to prevent them from displacing females, thereby
diminishing the athletic opportunities for girls and hindering equality of
opportunity between the sexes. 175 As stated in Petrie v. Illinois High School
Ass 'n, 176 excluding boys from girls' sports teams in order to permit girls to

develop their own athletic abilities does not carry the stigma of unworthiness
177

that excluding girls, based solely on the fact they are girls, carries.
Conversely, other courts have held that prohibiting boys from playing on
girls' athletic teams is discriminatory. 17 1 In Attorney General v. Massachusetts InterscholasticAthletic Ass'n,'79 the court held that the exclusion of boys
cannot be justified by biological differences between girls and boys, interest
in protecting players' safety, or an interest in fostering emerging girls' sports
programs.8 0 One court viewed the twenty-year history of liberalizing athletics
as having caused males to suffer limited athletic opportunities and therefore
found that excluding a boy from playing on the girls' team violated his equal

protection rights. 8'

173. Clark v. Arizona Interscholastic Ass'n, 695 F.2d 1126 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that
boys could be excluded because the policy of excluding males is substantially related to the
government interest of redressing past discrimination against women and promoting equality
of athletic opportunity between the sexes); See also Mularadelis v. Haldane Cent. Sch. Bd., 427
N.Y.S.2d 458 (N.Y. 1980) (holding the exclusion of males was a permissible means of
redressing disparate treatment of female athletes and did not violate the equal protection of
males, because males had an opportunity to participate in sports in general under the school
regulations).
174. 695 F.2d 1126 (9th Cir. 1982).
175. Id. See also Petrie v. Illinois High Sch. Assoc., 394 N.E.2d 855 (Ill. 1979) (holding
that restricting participation on the only volleyball team to girls was valid because it furthers the
compelling government interest of fostering athletic opportunities for girls); Mularadelis v.
Haldane Cent. Sch. Bd., 427 N.Y.S.2d 458 (N.Y. 1980) (holding that males could be prohibited
from competing on the girls tennis team even though there was no boys' tennis team).
176. Petrie v. Illinois, 394 N.E.2d 855 (Ill. 1979) (reasoning that there is no stigma of
unworthiness attached under the circumstances and the exclusion is not based on archaic
generalizations as are reasons for excluding girls).
177. Id.
178. But see Clark v. Arizona Interscholastic Ass'n, 695 F.2d 1126 (9th Cir. 1989)
(holding contra, that the overall inequality of opportunity does not justify specific inequality in
a particular sport); Williams v. School Dist. of Bethlehem, 799 F. Supp. 513 (E.D. Pa. 1992),
rev'd on other grounds, 998 F.2d 168 (3rd Cir. 1993) (holding that excluding a boy who sought
to play on the girls' team violated his equal protection rights).
179. 393 N.E.2d 284 (Mass. 1979).
180. Id. (holding that prohibiting boys from participation on a girls' team was invalid).
181. See Williams v. School Dist. of Bethlehem, 799 F. Supp. 513 (E.D. Pa. 1992), rev'd
on other grounds, 998 F.2d 168 (3rd Cir. 1993) (ruling that excluding a boy who sought to play
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However, most courts follow the reasoning in Forte v. Board of
Education,'8 2 which held that prohibiting male students from participating on
the girls' volleyball team was a permissible means toward redressing disparate
83
treatment of female students in athletic programs.1 The court relied on the
long history of male advantage to uphold regulations preventing male
participation in order to afford girls an opportunity to develop programs equal
to boys' .184 In sum, boys have been given, and continue to receive, greater
athletic opportunities. Therefore, the exclusion of boys from girls' high
school athletic teams prevents boys from further dominating and displacing
185
females from meaningful participation in athletics.
CONCLUSION

One would have thought the issue of discrimination within school
athletic programs was put to rest when Title IX was enacted. Title IX, a
federal law, prohibits gender discrimination in school sports programs
receiving federal funds.'86 Unfortunately, due to inconsistent rulings, the issue
of male and female team participation remains unsettled.
Generally, if a male team is offered, but no female team, the courts
conclude females should be permitted to play on the male team in noncontact
sports. Regarding contact sports, courts are split on whether physical
differences justify denying all females the right to participate without any
regard to their strength or ability. Courts have also been inconsistent
regarding the question of whether males must be allowed to play on female
teams if a male team is not offered. This author proposes that two separate
and equal (substantially comparable and receiving equal support) teams
should be provided. Girls, based on ability, should qualify to participate on
boys' teams regardless of whether the sport is a contact or non-contact sport.
In order to further the participation of female athletes and afford girls'

on the girls' team violated his equal protection rights because girls, who could try out for
traditionally male-dominated teams, were eligible to join twenty-two different teams, and boys,
who could not try out for traditionally female-dominated teams, were eligible for only twelve
teams).
182. 431 N.Y.S.2d 321 (1980).
183. Id. at 324.
184. Id.
185. Woods, supra note 43, at 907 (acknowledging that the number of girls participating
in sports has increased, and when athletic opportunities for males do not exceed those afforded
to females, this rationale must fail). However, the need for redressing past discrimination is still
existent at this point in time. Id.
186. Education Amendments of 1972, supra note 1.
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programs the opportunity to develop as fully as boys', the exclusion of boys
from girls' athletic teams is justified.
There are many pressing issues concerning American women these days.
Included among them are poverty, sexual violence, reproductive liberty,
occupational inequality, sexual harassment, discrimination, and childcare
issues. In comparison to these problems, equality in sports may seem trivial.
Yet, athletic participation promotes physical and psychological health and it
fosters personal skills and relationships. With every athletic achievement
comes prestige, respect, and self-esteem. These are not trivial concerns.
Gender disparities in sports are not only a consequence of cultural stereotypes
but also a cause of these stereotypes.
Discriminatory practices in educational institutions can never be
justified. The enthusiasm of administrators, the prestige of the sport, the
quality of the coaches, and the standardization of rules and scheduling must
be examined when evaluating the equality of athletic programs. With the
advent of associations such as the Women's Basketball Association and the
Women's Hockey Association, high school sports programs, as training
grounds, are more important than ever. Athletic programs based on equality
will further the goals of providing educational opportunities and athletic
experiences for all.
TRACY J. JOHNSON

